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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a burgeoning literature has emerged on the mobility as a service (MaaS) 
concept—a popular interpretation of future collaborative and connected urban transportation, 
centred on a changing society embracing a sharing culture which can satisfy our mobility 
needs without owning assets such as a car. MaaS emerges because of opportunities afforded by 
digital information platforms to plan and deliver multimodal mobility options in point-to-point 
trips and/or first-and-last mile travel to public transport journeys. MaaS packages will provide 
consumers with seamless mobility options with integrated payments through a single 
application in much the same way as unified mobile plans provide users with a choice of calls, 
text and data options. 
 
The premise for MaaS is to transform mobility based on asset ownership (usually, in 
the form of a private vehicle) to one where it may be consumed as a service. Central to this 
proposition is the move from outright purchase of mobility provision to a subscription-based 
model with a higher marginal cost of consumption, as compared with vehicle ownership where 
much of the cost is borne initially upfront and thereby regarded as ‘sunk’. Accompanying this 
challenge of acceptance is the public’s ideological attachment towards cars (1), but changing 
demographics offer encouraging signs for (at least in the younger generation in the West) 
embracing this cultural shift. Already, some versions of MaaS have been implemented, with 
UbiGo in Gothenburg and Whim in Helsinki (now also Birmingham) as promient examples, 
and core characteristics of MaaS schemes also beginning to be defined (2; 3). 
 
The design and implementation of MaaS may be related to the three Bs “budgets, 
bundles and brokers” initially proposed in Hensher (4: 91). Bundles relate to mobility 
packages which customers purchase, granting them a defined volume of access to each 
included mode (usually quantified by kilometres, hours or a percentage discount). Stated 
choice studies on end user preferences for bundled mobility products have thus far been 
conducted in London (5), Sydney (6), Newcastle upon Tyne (ITLS, forthcoming), as well as in 
work commissioned by industry bodies and consultancies as a way of revealing potential user 
preferences. Market testing MaaS is related to the budgets concept in terms of the need to 
elucidate the preferences of all stakeholders including demanders and suppliers in the MaaS 
supply chain. Far less work has to date been undertaken on the supply-side, particularly 
around potential business models and the likely emergence of mobility brokers (also known 
as aggregators) which bring together specialised businesses and value-add by offering that 
integrative function. Brokers form the conduit for connecting demanders of transport service 
and suppliers of the transport asset/capacity by facilitating the delivery of physical 
transportation (7). 
 
In this paper, we focus on the second and third Bs in terms of mobility brokers and the 
budgets (preferences) of suppliers by identifying the conditions around which interested 
businesses might invest or supply in the MaaS entrepreneurial model. An empirical program of 
work based on interviews and participatory research helps inform the candidate attributes for 
inclusion in business investment utility models we are developing for MaaS. Our qualitative 
research focuses on key stakeholders including MaaS operators, conventional transport 
operators, public transport authorities and consultancies, especially those in Sweden and 
Finland where such schemes are presently well advanced. Through this, mobility contracts are 
designed and incorporated as part of a stated choice experiment to test supplier buy-in to the 
entrepreneurial model or broker interface for delivering MaaS. A face-to-face pilot with 
experts and industry stakeholders is then undertaken to finesse the survey instrument. 
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Preliminary results based on data collected to date are then presented. MaaS as a concept is 
moving fast, but we believe we have begun the first formalised study to test some of the ideas 
behind service delivery—this paper presents our starting position on the journey to fill this 
important research gap. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our 
framework for the MaaS ecosystem, including brokers and the idea of mode-agnostic mobility 
contracts. Section 3 presents the method used to help us design these contracts and test our 
survey instrument. Section 4 discusses candidate attributes like how modal mix, risk and 
return, business size and equity contribution, branding and government support might 
influence respondents’ propensity to invest/supply in these new business models. Following 
this, Section 5 presents the experimental design, including decisions around the sampling 
frame and what respondent characteristics or contextual variables to collect. Initial results are 
presented in Section 6 by applying a mixed logit choice model on data collected thus far. 
Section 7 concludes and describes next steps in our effort to identify the structure of mobility 
broker models for delivering MaaS. 
 
2. DELIVERING MOBLITY AS A SERVICE 
A number of service delivery models have been proposed for MaaS, with a range of different 
actors and varying degrees of government involvement. We propose a likely model based on 
mobility brokers/aggregators and defined by mode-agnostic mobility contracts which form the 
basis for this study. 
 
2.1 Defining the broker: New business models 
To date, fully-fledged MaaS brokers/aggregators remain few and far in between. Part of the 
reason is because the design and institutionalisation of such business model is particularly 
demanding given that innovations occur outside the exclusive control of traditional firm 
boundaries (8). Romanyuk (9) argues that MaaS is not a traditional business model but rather a 
networked business model co-created in a network of actors where the development process is 
continuous and iterative by nature. Kamargianni and Matyas (10) propose seven candidate 
actors including transport operators, data providers, technology and platform providers, 
information and communication technology infrastructure, insurance companies, regulatory 
organisations and universities/research institutions. Government is an active player amongst 
these actors which even as an interface magnifies the aggregation challenge. In their work, 
Kamargianni and Matyas (10) advocate for a government agency or quasi-government entity 
(including a public transport authority) to assume this broker role. Jittrapirom et al. (11), 
however, in a Delphi study of 46 experts found transport operators as the preferred service 
integrator, followed by a third-party mobility provider and then local authorities. 
 
We believe a government broker is a particularly challenging proposition since they 
might not only lack the incentive to innovate but also cause a potential conflict of interest, 
especially where both public and private operators exist as is the case in Australia. In Australia 
(and most other Western economies), government is increasingly removing themselves from 
service provision but rather only involving themselves at arm’s length (12). They are better 
positioned playing a regulatory function to ensure a ‘level’ playing field (including setting 
common standards) for different MaaS operators to compete. We have hence assumed a 
private entity broker in our proposed model of the MaaS ecosystem for this research. 
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2.2 Situating the broker: Mode-agnostic mobility contracts 
Having defined the broker, it is now necessary to situate it within a framework of demanders, 
suppliers and government (Figure 1). Brokers bring together suppliers of the transport 
asset/capacity, as well as other specialised businesses (like platform providers and financial 
enterprises), with this interface defined by mobility contracts. Opportunities exist for suppliers 
to also take up this broker role, as is the case with government-sponsored on demand 
(microtransit-type) trials in NSW (hence the blue shading). The broker in turn packages these 
raw services as bundles to demanders (end users), who purchases these products under a 
subscription or pay-as-you-go model. Given the new MaaS focus, government (who 
previously dealt directly with transport operators/suppliers) would now also interface with the 
MaaS broker/aggregator. Whether the broker(s) operate in an economically deregulated or a 
contracted environment (defined by what we term accessibility contracts as explored in Wong, 
Hensher and Mulley (7)) is beyond the scope of the present discussion. There is merit, 
however, in considering a framework without government interference initially to determine 
what the market is willing to provide before an institutional overlay is applied to ensure 
alignment with broader societal objectives. This is the approach we are assuming and has been 
supported by our fieldwork. 
 
FIGURE 1: Proposed framework for the MaaS ecosystem, comprising the new function 
for a mobility broker aggregating different suppliers and delivering integrated service to 
demanders—excerpt from Wong, Hensher and Mulley (7) 
 
Our primary interest in this paper, however, is in the broker/supplier interface as 
governed by mobility contracts. Various forms of involvement are possible from these 
constituent suppliers ranging from mere financing (investing) of the service provider to 
supplying intellectual knowhow or tangible assets like vehicles and depots. We have further 
considered at length what MaaS might mean for the future of public transport contracts (4). In 
Australia, there is a move from area-based, mode-specific, output-based contracts (in effect, to 
deliver kilometres on defined vehicle types), to mode-agnostic, outcome-based contracts 
where the MaaS operator has the flexibility to deliver services using any mode of their 
choosing. This suggestion aligns with public transport institutional reform over the past 30 
years, including the increasing desire for a hybrid model which brings together the best of a 
contracted regime with the benefits and incentives inherent under economic deregulation (12). 
This serves as the theoretical underpinning for our empirical research program to design the 
broker/supplier interface that is the mobility contract. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
To design mobility contracts, we embarked on a qualitative program of interviews and 
participatory research with key stakeholders during August 2017. Informal interviews 
(structured around a study visit) were held with senior decision makers of two incumbent 
MaaS operators active in Helsinki and their regional public transport authority HSL. Our 
participatory research took place at the 15th International Conference on Competition and 
Ownership in Land Passenger Transport (known as the Thredbo series) in Stockholm where 
we ran a workshop over four days on the “‘uberisation’ of public transport and mobility as a 
service (MaaS)” (documented in Mulley and Kronsell (13)). Twenty-seven participants 
representing academia, government and industry (including transport operators and 
consultancies) came together in this Thredbo workshop (henceforth, the Workshop) to consider 
the objectives of MaaS, regulatory challenges, policy recommendations and research priorities 
(amongst other issues). We took these opportunities to test which attributes ought to be 
included in mobility contracts, the units they should be specified in (and levels), as well as 
candidate contextual influences on choice outcomes. 
 
With mobility contracts defined, we then designed them as hypothetical choice 
scenarios and incorporated these choice tasks and other contextual variables as part of a stated 
choice experiment. Given the novelty of the MaaS concept and limited application of stated 
preference methods on supply-side issues in any market, a face-to-face testing process was 
required to finesse and validate the survey instrument (conducted in February to April 2018). 
An extensive pilot (n=23) was undertaken with experts and industry leaders with a focus on 
language, layout, the suitability of questions and contextual variables. Data was collected from 
this process to validate the model and confirm priors. The pilot results and qualitative research 
inform Sections 4 and 5. 
 
4. MOBILITY CONTRACT DESIGN 
Informed by fieldwork, a mobility contract was built around five attribute categories and 
thirteen design attributes. Table 1 outlines the list of attributes and attribute levels whilst 
Figure 2 situates them within an example choice task design. We now discuss the rationale for 
including each attribute. 
 
TABLE 1: Attributes and attribute levels 
 
Attribute category Attribute 
Attribute levels 
Reference/base level 
underlined for dummy 
variables 
Mobility offering (Revenue 
mix) 
Sums to 100% 
Fixed route public transport 
0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 
80, 90, 100% 
On demand public transport 
0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 
80, 90, 100% 
Carsharing 
0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 
80, 90, 100% 
Taxi-like services 
0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 
80, 90, 100% 
Shared ridehailing services 
0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 
80, 90, 100% 
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Government support 
Appeal to government 
through strategic/regulatory 
support 
Enthusiastic, Lukewarm, 
None 
Monetary support for fixed 
route public transport 
N/A (nested level), Yes, No 
Return on investment 
Expected average annual 
return on investment 
-10, -5, 0, 5, 10, 15, 20% 
Possible range for annual 
return on investment 
±2, 4, 6, 8, 10% applied 
additively to above attribute 
Business branding 
MaaS business and service 
branding 
[Own company]-branded, 
New company branding, 
Partner company branding 
Equity contribution 
Total value of the MaaS 
business 
Segmented by value 
Small: USD 0.7, 1, 2.5, 4.5, 
7, 10 million 
Medium: USD 7, 10, 25, 45, 
70, 100 million 
Large: USD 70, 100, 250, 
450, 700, 1000 million 
Proportion equity and voting 
rights in the MaaS business 
10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60% 
Equity contribution to the 
MaaS business 
Product of above two 
attributes 
 
4.1 Mobility offering (Revenue mix) 
Mobility offering defines the mix of modes operated by a mobility broker and in turn offered 
as part of integrated packages to end users. Five modes were selected as part of the potential 
set, noting that on demand public transport differs from shared ridehailing services in that 
there is an underlying contract being serviced by a subcontractor—often a transportation 
network company (TNC) and heavily subsidised. The proportion of revenue from the five 
modes total 100%. Sole modal offerings (i.e., 100% of one mode and 0% of the rest) can thus 
be interpreted as a status quo mode-specific contract. The need for this mobility offering 
attribute category is to test how different modal mixes might alter the propensity for 
respondents to invest/supply in the mobility broker. In the [Thredbo] Workshop, participants 
felt overwhelmingly that public transport ought to be at the core of any MaaS model. Whether 
public transport will naturally dominate, or must government play a role in directing the 
market through regulation and subsidies, is an unknown worth testing. We believe respondents 
from different sectors will be more inclined to support contracts with a particular modal bent 
(e.g., TNCs will support those with more taxi-like services). 
 
4.2 Government support 
Two types of government involvement have been selected as attributes defining each mobility 
contract, both of which exist as dummy variables. First, strategic/regulatory support refers to 
government in-principle support for MaaS, which may be exhibited through general policy 
direction (government masterplans, etc.) and further operationalised through the regulatory 
environment. Private investors are likely to avoid entry where there is only lukewarm 
government support or great market uncertainty. In pilot testing, this attribute was deemed 
even more important for publicly-owned transport operators. The Workshop recognised great 
tension between policy formulation and operator viewpoints, with regulatory support for MaaS 
which attempts to control for market failure thought to have the unintended consequence of 
stifling innovation (13). 
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The second attribute refers to monetary support by government in terms of any subsidy 
adjustment for fixed route public transport (the status quo) given a greater MaaS focus in the 
future. This constitutes a nested attribute since it will not feature for mobility contracts without 
a fixed route public transport component. There are important links here with whether MaaS 
can evolve in the absence of government financial support, and also the possible need for 
community service obligation payments to the broker. The question of whether these subsidies 
will be passed on as a profit margin to the private enterprise is also relevant. 
 
4.3 Return on investment 
Potential return on investment is a critical part of any business decision. Two attributes are 
included in this category—the expected average annual return and the potential variance in 
this return, the latter capturing risk and uncertainty. The expected return (linked to profit 
margin) varies in 5% increments between -10% and +20%. Negative return levels are included 
given the ubiquity of TNCs making short term losses in an effort to gain (effectively 
‘purchase’) market share, backed by venture capital investors. The Workshop revealed 
Australian bus operators exhibiting a strong desire to enter the on demand market regardless of 
cost in order to showcase themselves as entrepreneurial, and hence help them win future 
tenders (particularly given government interest in on demand of late). We also found return 
expectations to vary considerably between businesses, with 8-30% having been touted (the 
upper end not uncommon with the community transport sector). 
 
Return on investment might be a dominating attribute, but it is equally important to 
consider how this figure might vary. Realistically, the return might be based on some form of 
distribution (e.g., normal), but for simplicity we have not placed a probability for how this 
return might vary. Instead, a possible range for this return is defined, based on applying a 
number (2-10%) additively to the expected return. True return on investment will hence range 
between -20% to +30%, though a much smaller range will be displayed within each mobility 
contract. 
 
4.4 Business branding 
Branding, bidding power and ownership of the customer emerged as important issues during 
the interview program and Workshop. On one hand, businesses are keen to maintain their 
brand since customer loyalty is part of the value proposition they bring to any relationship. 
This is especially the case with Australian bus operators, who pointed to their loss of livery 
and brand identity as part of recent changes to the contracting regime. In partnering with 
technology providers (for instance, for on demand trials in NSW), bus operators found it 
difficult to proceed with larger players like Uber who were adamant in maintaining their 
brand, control of data and their digital platform. In the Helsinki case, the regional authority 
HSL expressed an element of regret in partnering with a MaaS provider since it meant a loss of 
control of their product, including marketing and ticket distribution channels. We have hence 
designed three dummy levels to capture and test how branding might influence choice 
outcomes. 
 
4.5 Equity contribution 
The three equity contribution attributes devised are important in that they define the scale of 
the MaaS business and also the size of respondents’ stake in the broker. The first of these 
attributes relate to the size of the broker business by total value in USD—selected as a global 
currency of trade. It is crucial to include a dollar item to estimate willingness-to-pay for 
individual attributes. A fixed range of dollars were devised, and segmentation by value in 
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terms of organisation size implemented to ensure that the contracts remain relevant (almost a 
pivot design in effect). After thorough testing, we settled on using number of employees 
(collected as an earlier contextual variable) as a proxy for capturing organisation size, 
recognising the limitation in terms of labour intensity differences across sectors. The three 
respondent segments are small (≤999 employees), medium (1,000-9,999) and large (≥10,000) 
enterprises. 
 
The second attribute relates to respondents’ proportional equity contribution in the 
MaaS business, which range in 10% increments from 10-60%. Voting rights in the business are 
understood to be directly correlated with their equity investment, though in reality this may not 
always be the case. We propose to test how different broker sizes might affect interest in the 
business. For some companies, they may want a dominating share (and be monopolists) whilst 
others might be more risk averse and prefer a smaller starting stake. The actual contribution by 
respondents in USD is the final attribute and a function of the previous two values. Actual 
contribution captures either the value of respondents’ financial investment or investment in-
kind, thereby monetarising assets to their equivalent amount in equity (capturing the two 
choice response variables investing and supplying in the contract). This may be more difficult 
for transport operators in the case where government owns the assets, but there exists the 
opportunity for operators to use contracted assets in private work—charters are one example 
(14). The actual contribution range varies between USD 0.07-6 million for small enterprises, 
USD 0.7-60 million for medium enterprises, and USD 7-600 million for large enterprises. We 
ensured a degree of overlap to cater for organisation sizes at the margin. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Screenshot of a choice task programmed in the survey instrument, for a 
hypothetical medium-sized mode-specific operator Metro 
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5. THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Having identified relevant attributes for mobility contracts, we then designed them as stated 
choice tasks and incorporated these, together with contextual variables, into a state-of-the-art 
survey instrument. The qualitative research informed the survey structure as well as candidate 
respondents. 
 
5.1 Choice tasks and choice responses 
The mobility contracts were incorporated within a hypothetical setting using best practice 
design principles to define alternatives associated with designed levels of attributes (15). 
Using Ngene, we generated D-efficient choice tasks of four alternatives (three mobility 
contracts plus one no choice/reference status quo—see Figure 2) in a six block, four sets per 
block design. The [Thredbo] Workshop explored a suite of partnership issues looking at 
market relationships in the MaaS era and the development of collaborations beyond standard 
procurement procedures (13). Recognising this, we offered choice responses to either supply in 
or invest into the new MaaS business. The difference herein lies between contributing physical 
assets and assets in-kind (e.g., buses, depots, personnel) or becoming solely a financial 
shareholder in the broker business. To better understand how respondents might supply, we 
asked which assets they would contribute (technology, vehicle, bricks and mortar, right-of-way 
and personnel), what partners they might like to work with (other transport operators, platform 
providers and financial enterprises—all of which we regard as crucial), as well as how 
involvement will affect their present service offering (in the case of mode-specific operators). 
 
5.2 Contextual variables and survey structure 
The survey instrument included a range of contextual questions to further embellish the stated 
choice data. The survey begins with objective questions collecting respondent characteristics, 
including market sector, ownership structure, jurisdiction of operation and number of 
employees. The survey then branches and for mode-specific operators, we ask for the modes 
they operate and for a vehicle count of each mode (as another measure of organisation size). 
Non-mobility providers are asked for their transport-related activities and interest in future 
transport initiatives. Both groups are requested to provide their return on investment 
expectations and perceived risk-free rate. Remarkably, industry respondents in the pilot 
exhibited no qualms in sharing this information (despite concern from academic experts). 
 
Experience-conditioned discrete choice models constitute a recent advancement in the 
choice modelling literature, which to date has seen only limited applications—in transport 
modelling contexts (16; 17), healthcare (18; 19) and recreation (20). Each of these studies 
have found that respondent preferences are heavily influenced by their experience or 
familiarity with attributes and alternatives in the choice task. In the case of products or 
services not yet available on the market (like MaaS), then the conditioning agent can be 
considered as the respondents’ awareness of an idea or experience. To account for 
heteroscedasticity conditioning in the analysis, we ask for respondents’ (and their 
organisations’) familiarity with the MaaS concept. We finish the survey by asking respondents 
to rate (on a Likert-scale) their decision-making confidence so as to allow us to validate the 
data and examine preference stability (21). The survey concludes with questions about 
respondents’ position title, responsibilities and years active in the industry to see whether these 
factors might carry particular biases in their responses. 
 
5.3 Candidate respondents 
A candidate sampling frame was defined in terms of jurisdiction, market sector and position 
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level. We desired an international survey from the outset to obtain a global view, but recognise 
that some level of comparability between contexts is important, given the vastly different 
institutional and governance arrangements between countries. Hence, the jurisdictions of 
Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Western Europe and the United States were selected 
as the core sampling frame due to similar perspectives on risk and investment, and a level of 
dialogue and engagement between these economies. 
 
The organisations selected were categorised under mode-specific operators 
(incumbent providers of passenger service) and non-mobility providers (new entrants) 
interested in partaking in the MaaS business model. Mode-specific operators include public 
transport operators, taxi operators, transportation network companies, carshare operators and 
bikeshare operators. Non-mobility providers comprise of vehicle manufacturers/suppliers, 
technology providers/startups, financial enterprises, infrastructure operators, property 
developers, telecommunications providers, consultancies, insurance companies and industry 
bodies. As mentioned, we decided that governments (i.e., transport regulators/authorities) 
would not form part of the candidate sample (unless they were an operator of transport 
service) since we deemed it unlikely they would partner within a mobility broker model (see 
Section 2.1). 
 
One of the most important issues and major challenges in the study of business is 
identifying relevant decision makers within an organisation since preference responses are 
highly dependent on who provides the data (22). Our specific focus is on senior executives 
making investment decisions within companies in the market sectors of interest (e.g., 
Managing Directors, Chief Executive Officers). Respondent-specific data and firm-specific 
data were captured to account for different organisational structures between companies. In 
terms of recruitment, we engaged our partners in academia and industry (bus associations 
being particularly helpful) to assist with outreach as part of the respondent recruitment 
process. 
 
6. PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
Data collection on the live survey instrument has been in progress since May 2018. 202 
responses have been collected as of October 2018 (Table 2), with a roughly equal mix of 
mode-specific operators and non-mobility providers, as well as Australian and non-Australian 
organisations. Small enterprises, however, account for 55% of the sample, as compared with 
25% medium and 20% large. We believe this is representative of the potential mix of 
interested businesses. Based on design levels, the mean attribute levels (Table 3) for mobility 
contracts which respondents chose to invest or supply in were determined. These reveal a large 
public transport component amongst MaaS businesses which garnered the highest level of 
support. A higher return on investment expectation is also evident when respondents were 
asked to invest rather than supply. Larger business propositions are preferred by non-mobility 
providers, more than double the size of those selected by mode-specific operators. Finally, the 
average preferred stake in the broker business is around one third, with implied voting rights 
to the same extent. 
 
TABLE 2: Respondent sample for data collected thus far 
 
 Mode-specific operator Non-mobility provider Grand Total 
Jurisdiction S M L Total S M L Total  
Australia 32 12 1 45 24 9 10 43 88 
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New Zealand 1 3  4   1 1 5 
Singapore 2 2 1 5  1 1 2 7 
Hong Kong  1 1 2 3   3 5 
Other Asia   3 3   4 4 7 
United Kingdom 2 2 2 6 6 1  7 13 
Belgium  1  1 1  6 7 8 
Germany     6  1 7 7 
Luxembourg 2 1  3 3  1 4 7 
Other Europe  3 1 4 12   12 16 
United States 3 4 1 8 10 4 2 16 24 
Canada  4  4  1 3 4 8 
Other Countries  2  2 5   5 7 
Grand Total 42 35 10 87 70 16 29 115 202 
 
TABLE 3: Mean attribute levels for chosen alternatives (mobility contracts), stratified by 
organisation type and choice response 
 
 Willing-to-invest Willing-to-supply 
 Mode-specific 
operator 
Non-mobility 
provider 
Mode-specific 
operator 
Non-mobility 
provider 
Fixed route public 
transport 
33.1% 23.3% 35.0% 26.8% 
On demand public 
transport 
18.2% 21.4% 18.6% 20.2% 
Carsharing 14.5% 17.3% 14.6% 18.5% 
Taxi-like services 19.2% 16.8% 16.4% 15.4% 
Shared ridehailing 
services 
14.9% 21.3% 15.3% 19.0% 
Expected average 
annual ROI 
8.9% 8.6% 6.5% 7.1% 
ROI risk/variance ±6.5% ±6.2% ±6.3% ±6.4% 
Total value of MaaS 
business 
USD 62.5 
million 
USD 133.8 
million 
USD 66.2 
million 
USD 134.4 
million 
Proportion equity and 
voting rights 
36.2% 34.4% 38.0% 34.90% 
Equity contribution to 
MaaS business 
USD 21.4 
million 
USD 44.4 
million 
USD 25.6 
million 
USD 44.9 
million 
Sample cases 270 319 332 405 
 
A number of choice models were estimated using the econometric software package 
NLOGIT6, using generic utility functions for an unlabelled choice experiment. We began with 
a simple multinomial logit (fixed parameters) model to test the robustness of the model before 
moving to a more advanced, mixed logit (random parameters) model. Table 4 shows the 
statistical significance of the parameter estimates and how they contribute to the utility of a 
packaged alternative. It is clear again that public transport (both fixed and on demand) is an 
important part of the preferred modal mix. Return on investment and business size are also 
relevant attributes. Surprisingly, branding considerations proved to be statistically insignificant 
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(and thus omitted from this model). It is worth noting that even if the parameters are not 
statistically significant at their mean values, their variance (standard deviation parameter 
estimate) may be significant, demonstrating preference heterogeneity across the sample that is 
not adequately accommodated through only having a mean estimate. We added an alternative-
specific constant on Mobility Contract 1 (ASCA) to investigate any possible left-right bias in 
terms of selected alternatives within the sample (noting that a constant has no behavioural 
meaning in a strictly unlabeled choice experiment except for directional bias). For the null (no 
choice) alternative, we tested contextual variables and found different effects between the 
invest and supply choice responses and respondents’ organisation type (mode-specific or non-
mobility). 
 
TABLE 4: Mixed logit model parameters 
 
  Willing-to-invest Willing-to-supply 
  Parameter estimates (z-
score) 
Parameter estimates (z-
score) 
Random parameters: Mean 
      
Fixed route public transport (%) 0.02709 *** (4.22) 0.03673 *** (5.68) 
On demand public transport (%) 0.38287 *** (5.97) 0.37955 *** (6.04) 
Carsharing (%) 0.00452 
 
(0.62) 0.01420 ** (2.27) 
Taxi-like services (%) 0.00271 
 
(0.40) 0.00111 
 
(0.18) 
Shared ridehailing services (%) 0.01606 ** (2.54) 0.01704 *** (2.88) 
Lukewarm appeal to government 
(1/0) 
-0.17075 
 
(-0.88) 0.02043 
 
(0.12) 
Enthusiastic appeal to government 
(1/0) 
0.44278 * (1.90) 0.62552 *** (3.18) 
Monetary support for public transport 
(1/0) 
0.24712 
 
(1.29) 0.38618 ** (2.07) 
Expected average annual ROI (%) 0.09092 *** (7.06) 0.02993 *** (3.07) 
Potential variability in ROI (±%) -0.02736 
 
(-0.97) -0.00064 
 
(-0.02) 
Total value of MaaS business (USD 
millions) 
-0.00036 
 
(-0.65) 0.00012 
 
(0.25) 
Proportion equity and voting rights 
(%) 
0.00230 
 
(0.48) 0.00393 
 
(0.84) 
Fixed (non random) parameters 
      
ASCA -0.09884 
 
(-0.58) -0.42292 *** (-2.66) 
No choice constant (Null) 2.41732 *** (2.74) -0.52252 
 
(-0.56) 
Mode-specific operator (For null) 0.13582 
 
(0.36) 0.93656 ** (2.12) 
Random parameters: Distribution 
(Normal) 
     
Fixed route public transport (%) 0.03055 *** (5.68) 0.04138 *** (6.08) 
On demand public transport (%) 
(Constrained) 
0.38287 *** (5.97) 0.37955 *** (6.04) 
Carsharing (%) 0.02491 *** (3.40) 0.00483 
 
(0.47) 
Taxi-like services (%) 0.02520 *** (4.28) 0.02747 *** (4.37) 
Shared ridehailing services (%) 0.00726 
 
(0.89) 0.01657 *** (2.91) 
Lukewarm appeal to government 
(1/0) 
1.10803 *** (4.41) 0.46345 * (1.77) 
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Enthusiastic appeal to government 
(1/0) 
1.71270 *** (5.60) 1.18668 *** (4.51) 
Monetary support for public transport 
(1/0) 
0.66019 ** (2.37) 1.19684 *** (3.26) 
Expected average annual ROI (%) 0.09806 *** (7.17) 0.07832 *** (4.87) 
Potential variability in ROI (±%) 0.12010 *** (3.21) 0.13848 *** (3.61) 
Total value of MaaS business (USD 
millions) 
0.00253 *** (3.75) 0.00152 ** (2.30) 
Proportion equity and voting rights 
(%) 
0.02963 *** (4.90) 0.01669 (1.42) 
Model fit 
Log-likelihood at zero -1120.12584 -1120.12584
Log-likelihood at convergence -925.05508 -869.49122
McFadden Pseudo R-squared 0.1741508 0.2237558 
AIC (Sample adjusted) 2.354 2.217 
Mixed logit (random parameters) model based on 808 observations from 202 
respondents ***, **, * ==>  Significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level 
Using the mixed logit model, willingness-to-pay estimates (Table 5) were obtained 
with the Wald method (see Hensher, Rose and Greene (23)). The average willingness-to-pay 
for investing in a mobility contract is USD 8.66 million per 1% unit of public transport 
revenue, as compared with just USD 1.35 million per 1% revenue unit of carsharing. This 
again shows public transport to be an important part of the preferred modal mix, and the 
difference is even more profound when businesses consider the choice to supply. Interestingly, 
the comparative value of financial support as compared to strategic/regulatory support is 
small, showing a preference for government involvement at arm’s length only, without the 
possibility of undue interference. There are also signs of risk aversion evident with smaller 
equity contributions being preferred. As an application, our willingness-to-pay estimates can 
be used as inputs to determine the value of different MaaS business propositions. Table 6 
prices the mean preferred contracts (based on selected attributes only), given the preference 
function of the sample. We note the higher value of supplying in contracts, as compared with 
investing—consistent with our earlier findings. The values presented are a lifetime figure so 
(say) for a 20 year time horizon gives USD 35-50 million which we think is a reasonable sum. 
TABLE 5: Willingness-to-pay estimates for contract elements 
Willingness-to-pay estimates 
To invest (USD 
million) 
To supply (USD 
million) 
1% additional fixed route public transport 
revenue 
8.66 18.50 
1% additional on demand public transport 
revenue 
7.18 7.53 
1% additional carsharing revenue 1.35 3.76 
1% additional taxi-like services revenue 0.01 -0.21
1% additional shared ridehailing services 
revenue 
0.08 0.22 
Presence of government subsidy 39.31 122.28 
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Lukewarm appeal to government 78.38 129.67 
Enthusiastic appeal to government 260.26 360.08 
1% additional return on investment 42.48 27.69 
1% additional equity contribution -0.52 -3.94 
 
TABLE 6: Example mobility contracts and value (based on mean attribute levels in Table 
3) 
 
 Mobility contract 
 1 2 3 4 
Fixed route public transport 33.1% 23.3% 35.0% 26.8% 
On demand public transport 18.2% 21.4% 18.6% 20.2% 
Carsharing 14.5% 17.3% 14.6% 18.5% 
Taxi-like services 19.2% 16.8% 16.4% 15.4% 
Shared ridehailing services 14.9% 21.2% 15.3% 19.0% 
Expected average annual ROI 8.9% 8.6% 6.5% 7.1% 
Contract value to invest (USD million) 816.353 745.985 733.866 705.381 
Contract value to supply (USD million) 1,049.603 896.532 1,022.361 915.011 
 
7. CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS 
MaaS is a nascent topic which has emerged only in the past several years. Quantitative and 
empirical evidence on the design of supply-side subscription plans remains virtually non-
existent and in this paper we begin the process of tackling the challenge to identify the 
conditions around which businesses might invest or supply in the mobility broker/aggregator 
model. The interview and participatory research process helped define the potential attributes 
to include in the mobility contract whilst pilot testing (n=23) helped us refine the survey 
instrument used in this novel application on MaaS. Data collection has thus far been smooth 
but not without its challenges. We have received encouraging feedback including that the 
survey is interesting and helps respondents organise their thoughts, but many participants also 
found the choice scenarios a little difficult with a few dropping out and others raising concerns 
of sensitivity over some of the questions asked (an issue which did not emerge in pilot). Some 
non-mobility providers invited to participate (e.g., logistics companies) also felt that the 
survey was not relevant, though this is a finding in itself for us about likely market interest as 
investors and/or suppliers. Analysis of preliminary data (n=202) confirmed the robustness of 
our approach and offered some useful initial insights. 
 
We have commented on some of the challenges inherent and have prepared this paper 
with a view of streamlining future stated preference research on the supplier interface for 
MaaS. Our present focus is to continue data collection, with an aim to increase the present 
sample. As additional data is obtained, we will be further finessing our model, including 
interacting the attributes with the many (more than 50) contextual variables in the survey. 
Non-linear experience conditioned models (based on familiarity with the MaaS concept) will 
also be developed to test for any optimism bias (linked to the Gartner hype cycle) and how that 
might affect the preference of respondents. This will become an innovative first view on the 
topic and the beginning of greater interest in identifying the commercial, market-led 
equilibrium for MaaS. We plan to identify this by mapping the present results onto consumer 
preferences we have determined in our MaaS demand-side studies (6). Government can then 
evaluate whether it finds these results acceptable, aligning with the broader societal and urban 
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efficiency goals of cities, or whether an institutional overlay will be required to ensure that 
these objectives are met (7). Our research agenda is a first step towards informing these 
unknowns. 
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